West Papua – the silent genocide

By anatheimp

The news of David Cameron’s victory in the general election was a source of relief and celebration to the people of…West Papua. Excuse me? West Papua; why on earth should they care about the election of a Conservative leader in a country thousands of miles from where they live? The answer is simple; he is the only western leader to have taken the plight of the indigenous people seriously, people who have suffered from decades of physical and cultural extermination at the hands of successive Indonesian governments.

West Papua, part of the Island of Papua New Guinea, once a Dutch colony but under Indonesian occupation since the 1960s, does not often make the news, unless it’s in some niche show like Unreported World. But the people here, the native people, have been struggling for independence since the fraudulent ‘Act of Free Choice’ united them with Indonesia in 1969, even though they have no ethnic, political or religious identity with the occupiers. Their plight has been shamefully ignored by the rest of the world.

The Indonesia authorities keep a very close watch on place, allowing access only under the most restrictive conditions. Last year the International Committee of the Red Cross was thrown out by the government and has not been allowed to return. Cameron himself has described the plight of the tribes people as “a terrible situation.” Highland villages have been systematically destroyed by the army, resulting in an estimated 6000 people becoming ‘internal refugees’ in the rapidly diminishing forests. People have been jailed in a country, one that pretends to be a democracy, merely for raising the Morning Star flag, the flag of free Papua, in public.

This is really only the top of the story. According to international reports, including one complied by Yale Law School, the Papuans have been the subject of brutal ethnic cleansing. Precise figures are difficult to obtain, but it is estimated that since 1969 anything between 100, 000 and 700,000 people have been killed, raped or simply disappeared. Part of this genocide has involved the deliberate use of the HIV/AIDS virus by the Indonesian army, another part of the demographic disaster that has been inflicted on the people.

This has had a serious impact on the population levels of the local people but even more serious is the steady dilution caused by the arrival of well over a million Islamic settlers. This is part of a systematic process, part of what I would refer to as the ’silent genocide’, the attempt to destroy the last traces of the native people to ensure that opposition to the illegal annexation is ended forever.

What strikes me most about this story is the sheer hypocrisy of an international community that is all too willing to attack Israel, which has never, even by its most determined enemies, been accused of the attempted extermination of the Palestinians, while ignoring what is happening in places like West Papua. I suppose the cause of these people, these primitive, tribal people, is just not fashionable enough, just not the kind of thing to excite the conscience of the self-righteous liberal establishment. And for people in Indonesia, one of the most venal and corrupt nations on earth, to remain blind to the outrages of their own army in their own backyard really is quite appalling. May God forgive them, for nobody else will. Now let me retire to my pulpit to pass judgement on the rest of humanity.

Sumber; http://my.telegraph.co.uk

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FALEOMAVAEGA AND PAYNE SPEARHEAD EFFORT IN U.S. CONGRESS CALLING UPON THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE WEST PAPUA ONE OF ITS HIGHEST PRIORITIES

July 31, 2010
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

WASHINGTON, D.C.—CONGRESSMAN FALEOMAVAEGA AND CONGRESSMAN PAYNE SPEARHEAD EFFORT IN U.S. CONGRESS CALLING UPON THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE WEST PAPUA ONE OF ITS HIGHEST PRIORITIES

The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment, Rep. Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, and Chairman Donald M. Payne of the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health have spearheaded an effort in Congress calling upon President Obama to “make West Papua one of the highest priorities of the Administration.” As a result of their efforts, 50 Members of the U.S. Congress signed a letter to the President stating that there is strong indication that the Indonesian government has committed genocide against the Papuans. West Papua is the half of New Guinea that was invaded by Indonesia in 1962. While Papuan leaders have repeatedly tried to engage in dialogue with the Indonesian government, dialogues have failed to produce concrete results and Papuan leaders are now calling for an International Dialog. In this context, signatories of the letter have asked President Obama to meet with the people of West Papua during his upcoming trip to Indonesia in November. Many Members who signed the letter are members of the Congressional Black Caucus. The signatories include men and women who fought for civil rights in America in the 1960s. Younger politicians have also joined this initiative to support the people of West Papua who have suffered long enough. In addition to the Congressional Black Caucus, many other American leaders who are long-time advocates of human rights joined this request to the President of the United States, including members of the Hispanic Caucus. The last remaining member of the Kennedy family in Congress, Rep. Patrick Kennedy from Rhode Island, also signed the letter to President Obama. The letter to the President suggests that slow motion genocide has been taking place in West Papua and reviews findings by human rights organizations and scholars who have conducted extensive research about crimes against humanity and genocide by Indonesian security forces. “Genocide is usually difficult to document since leaders are often reluctant to state their intention to destroy another nation, race, or ethnic group,” Members of Congress wrote. “Even still, in 2007 Col. Burhanuddin Siagian, who was then the local regional commander (DANREM) said, ‘If I encounter elements that use government facilities, but still are betraying the nation, I will destroy them.’” According to international agreements, other nations are legally obligated to intervene when a genocide is in process and Members of Congress remain hopeful that President Obama and the U.S. State Department will hold Indonesia accountable. Members concluded their letter by encouraging the President to meet with the Team of 100 from West Papua during his upcoming visit, noting that President Obama has the opportunity to bring lasting change to this part of the world.

Source: http://www.house.gov/faleomavaega/index.shtml

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Not just another disaster

Papuan claims of genocide deserve to be taken seriously

Jim Elmslie

Inside Indonesia presents the first of two different views on the question of demographic change in Indonesian Papua. For many years, critics – both inside and outside Papua – have accused the Indonesian government of pursuing genocidal policies in the territory, in part by swamping it with migrants from other parts of Indonesia. We invited two writers to present their analyses of the situation. In this piece, Jim Elmslie argues that the accusations of genocide deserve serious consideration. For a very different take on the issue, see the article by Stuart Upton.

What is happening in West Papua is a matter of profound disagreement. Nobody who deserves to be taken seriously can deny that many human rights abuses have occurred there since West Papua was forcibly incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia in 1962 by a mixture of military aggression and diplomatic manoeuvering. But the nature and extent of these abuses, the character of the Indonesian military occupation, and the implications of the influx of hundreds of thousands of migrants into the territory raise even more serious possibilities.

Demographic catastrophe

Many West Papuans, such as Reverend Sofyan Yoman, head of the Baptist Church in Papua and an outspoken critic of the Indonesian government, believe that West Papuans are suffering genocide at the hands of the Indonesian state. Other observers, particularly the Indonesian government itself, dismiss this possibility out of hand. Who is right?

Part of the answer lies in looking at the demographic transition of the population. This is more complicated than merely glancing at the latest Indonesian census figures (2000). The census figures give the ethnic breakdown of the province (which then included both Papua and the new province of West Papua – I refer to them collectively as ‘West Papua’) as being 32 per cent non-Papuan migrants (708,425) and 68 per cent Papuan (1,505,405) with a total population of 2,213,831 (the latest projected population for the province(s) is 2.65 million in 2005). However, many Papuans do not believe these figures. After decades of lies and abuse from the Indonesian government, Jakarta has little credibility on the ground and many Papuans view any government statistics with scant regard, considering them to have been manipulated.

After decades of lies and abuse from the Indonesian government, Jakarta has little credibility on the ground and many Papuans view any government statistics with scant regard, considering them to have been manipulated

There is some evidence that West Papuans have good grounds for being doubtful of the 2000 census figures. There were only 1,697,984 responses to the census; a further 306,743 were ‘enumerated’ and there were 209,104 ‘non-responses’ to make up the total population of 2,213,831. Thus, nearly a quarter of the census was derived from extrapolation. During the collection of the census data in 2000, West Papua was in a state of political upheaval. This was the period referred to as the ‘Papuan Spring’ following the downfall of President Suharto, when long repressed feelings of West Papuan nationalism surfaced spectacularly. Mass gatherings of West Papuans advocated and planned for independence under the more lenient presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. In this situation collection of data was affected; some areas were considered unsafe to enter and many people viewed the exercise with skepticism or hostility and refused to participate. Nonetheess, most analysts take these figures at face value.

However, key Papuan observers ignore the Indonesian 2000 census figures. Leading intellectuals, such as Leo Laba Ladjar and Neles Tebay, perhaps Papua’s most respected contemporary social critics of Indonesian policy, quote figures from the Papuan Provincial Administration showing that non-Papuans in 2002 numbered 1,145,965 out of a total population of 2,387,427 or 48 per cent. In these figures Papuans make up only 52 per cent of the population at 1,241,462. I have been unable to independently verify these alternate figures but refer to them here as well-informed West Papuan commentators, like Tebay, use them and therefore believe them to be accurate. This in itself shows the level of distrust, and even disconnect, between the debate over demographics coming out of Jakarta and Jayapura. These are substantially different figures from the official Indonesian census, but add weight to claims that the West Papuans are being swamped – so much so that a ‘slow motion genocide’, in the words Clements Runawery, an early proponent of West Papuan independence, is underway.

Regardless of which set of population figures one believes, the same trends are evident. A demographic catastrophe is happening in West Papua and this is the basis for the genocide claim. In the 1971 census there were 887,000 indigenous Papuans (‘Irian born’) out of a total population of 923,000 – or 96 per cent. Migrants made up just four per cent of the population, yet only three decades later they comprised 48 per cent (or 32 per cent if we believe the census figures). Most of this increase is from inward migration from the rest of Indonesia.

Demographic swamping does not constitute genocide, but it does lay the foundations for it

As this trend continues it is quite obvious that Papuans will be a shrinking minority in their own land; they are already a minority in urban areas. In fact the inward flow of migrants seems to be increasing as up to six large passenger ships now arrive each week in Jayapura, the province’s capital city, to deliver thousands more migrants. Demographic swamping does not constitute genocide, but it does lay the foundations for it.

Genocidal rule

Papuans claim that the way Indonesia has ruled over them since 1962 constitutes genocide. Using the 2000 Indonesian census figure for the Papuan population of some 1.5 million represents an annual population growth rate since the 1971 census (887,000) of about 1.83 per cent. This is actually higher than the Indonesian overall population growth rate of 1.18 per cent, but Papua New Guinea, a comparable Melanesian society on the eastern half of the island, has an annual average population growth rate of 2.6 per cent per annum. If that rate had been experienced in West Papua the Papuan population would have been 1,867,226 in 2000. There are some 362,000 Papuans ‘missing’ from the Melanesian population if it had grown in step with its cousin next door in PNG. This is using the Indonesian government figures; if the Papuan Provincial Administration figures are used there are even less Papuans and an even lower growth rate.

What has happened to cause this decline in fertility? There are many factors that may have influenced the fertility rate in West Papua, including widespread contraceptive programs, a poor general standard of health, and the disruption caused by military operations and resource extraction industries.

In West Papua, as in other parts of Indonesia, the government (with the backing of the UN and other international agencies) has for decades implemented family planning programs that try to limit population growth. In West Papua, however, these programs have been conducted with minimal explanation by authorities or understanding by recipients, and with little other health services provided.

In the Baliem Valley, the heavily populated region in the mountainous interior of the country, people have suffered for years from high rates of sexually transmitted diseases, such as gonorrhea and chlamydia, both of which cause infertility if left untreated. Yet, even today, under the contraceptive program, these diseases are not treated, but sufferers are instead given long lasting contraceptive injections, such as Depo Provera or Norplant. Together, these two factors dramatically lower fertility.

West Papuans suffer the poorest health standards of any Indonesian citizens and receive the lowest level of health care. In the highlands, with a population of over 400,000 people there is only one hospital with 70 beds. There are only 15 other health centres where a doctor is supposedly in attendance. Infant mortality rates, as reported by AusAid, are 98 per 100,000 in the highlands region (compared to the Indonesian average of 40 per 100,000), although other reports have put this figure as high as 250 per 100,000. The life expectancy of women is only 50.3 years compared to an Indonesian national average of 62.7 years. A relatively new looming problem for the Papuans is HIV/AIDS. For example the combined HIV/AIDS rate in 2002 was 40 times higher than the Indonesian average. A recent AusAid study found that, on current projections, over seven per cent of West Papuans will have the disease by 2025. The health and fertility challenges that West Papuans face are only growing worse.

Since the Indonesian takeover in 1962 West Papuans have also had to contend with ongoing military operations against ‘separatists’. Up until today Indonesian troops have conducted ‘sweeping operations’ in pursuit of separatists, burning villages, destroying gardens and shooting pigs in the process. Troops have also shot, tortured and raped many villagers. A death toll of 100,000 is routinely quoted, although some commentators put the figure much higher. Nobody knows for sure what the true figures are as the research has never been done. Village populations are forced to live as refugees in their own land with little food and inadequate shelter in the cold mountains. Much traditional land has also been destroyed by widespread logging and mineral extraction operations, as well as loss of land appropriated by incoming migrants. This has made life for many Papuans much more difficult and led to higher mortality rates and a lower level of natural increase.

It is the obligation of the signatories of the UN Convention on Genocide to investigate claims of genocide – an obligation that signatories of the convention have yet to honour in the case of West Papua

Does all this amount to genocide? The 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide defines the crime of genocide as the ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’ by acts directed at that group which include: killings, causing serious mental or physical harm; deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about destruction of a group, and imposing measures to prevent births. It is hard to argue that these acts have not occurred in West Papua. The defence offered by those who deny that genocide has occurred is that the above acts have not been intentional, that is, part of official Indonesian government policy. It is impossible to know if the above acts have come about through official government intention, or through poor government and maladministration, but the claims of West Papuans should be taken seriously until disproved. It is the obligation of the signatories of the UN Convention on Genocide to investigate claims of genocide – an obligation that signatories of the convention have yet to honour in the case of West Papua.

Future trends

Besides the difficulty in ascertaining population statistics that are widely agreed upon, and the impossibility of proving whether or not genocide has occurred in West Papua without further investigation, the demographic figures do clearly point to more trouble ahead. The cities and urban areas of West Papua are now predominantly Asian communities peopled by recent migrants from other parts of Indonesia. The Indonesian census showed that 66 per cent of the urban population is non-Papuan; anecdotal and personal observation would confirm it as self-evident that West Papuan towns are now dominated by outsiders. But the situation is completely reversed in the rural areas of the territory. This is where 86 per cent of the Melanesian Papuan population lives; they are the overwhelming majority throughout the mountainous highland regions and in the swamplands to the north and south of the island’s central spine. It really is a tale of two countries; two very different countries.

In the urban environment West Papuans are already very much a minority. The reality is that the towns are Indonesian with a smattering of black faces. But out in the bush the West Papuans live in villages on their traditional lands, speak their own languages and still follow many of their ancient ways: it is Melanesia. To these West Papuans the Indonesians are an occupying force, and they dream of freedom in the form of independence. This dream has not diminished with time but actually seems to have strengthened. No meaningful opinion poll has ever been undertaken – how could it? – but any observer who has travelled through the region and talked with West Papuans cannot be left with any doubt of their wishes: independence is a sentiment that is universally and openly expressed, even if the achievement of that dream might seem almost impossible.

In the towns the Indonesian migrants focus on personal and family advancement. The Melanesians in the bush might live on another planet except for the souvenirs dangling from the awnings of the market stalls. For the Indonesian town-dwellers, proponents of independence are ‘separatists’ and viewed with the animosity befitting ‘traitors’. The military and police wage a continual program of suppression and surveillance, monitoring the West Papuans with a vast network of spies and intelligence operatives. Periodic military operations in the interior keep the province in a constant state of military alertness, almost on a war footing: the enemy is the West Papuans.

This stark chasm between the Indonesian towns and the Melanesian bush provide a profound dilemma for Indonesia. The schism between the two populations, indigenous and migrant, fuels conflict and military repression. The military remain unaccountable and largely autonomous from civilian control. Human rights abuses are common. As more troops are brought in and more command posts established, conflict only escalates. This process has a momentum of its own and has the potential to destroy Indonesia’s international standing. Indonesia is the world’s fourth most populous country and the largest Muslim nation. It is widely lauded as an emerging democracy which has made great gains in the rule of law and respect for human rights, but this is clearly not happening in West Papua. Just as East Timor blocked Indonesia’s emergence onto the world stage for 24 years, the growing crisis in West Papua may block Indonesia’s current transition and has the potential, like East Timor did, to dominate the international image of Indonesia.

It is impossible to prove that what is happening in West Papua is genocide without further investigation. To really know the answer, teams of investigators would need to comb through official records, interview ordinary people and search for evidence in the bush. None of that is going to happen while Indonesia remains in charge. Certainly many West Papuans, people living under Indonesian control, feel and think that what is happening to them is genocide. It is an obligation for signatories of the UN genocide convention to investigate these claims, and Indonesia should allow this to happen. Without major changes to government policy over West Papua, Indonesia faces an open-ended military occupation that threatens to poison the country’s own development and sabotage its international image at a crucial stage in Indonesian history. ii

Jim Elmslie (jelmslie@ozemail.com.au) is co-convenor of the West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney. His Ph.D. thesis, “Irian Jaya Under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development versus West Papuan Nationalism” was published by the University of Hawaii Press.

See also Jennifer Robinson's Man on a mission [ii96: Apr-Jun 2009]

Source: Inside Indonesia 97: Jul-Sep 2009

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A disaster, but not genocide

Migration has caused many problems in Papua, but it is not part of a genocidal master plan

Stuart Upton

In the second of two pieces on demographic change in Indonesian Papua, Inside Indonesia here presents an analysis by Stuart Upton that suggests – in contrast to the first piece written by Jim Elmslie –there is little hard evidence to support claims of genocide in Papua.

The indigenous population of Papua has resisted Indonesian control from the start. Since the Dutch passed sovereignty over Papua to Indonesian hands in 1963 there has been recurrent violence in the territory, resulting from the heavy military presence there. The armed forces have committed many human rights abuses. These are well-documented and indisputable. What is problematic is how these and similar experiences are interpreted. Many people have claimed that this violence, along with attacks on Papuan culture and social structures, constitutes a program of genocide against the indigenous population. This emotive term has been widely used by both indigenous and Western activists in the last few years. However, the case in favour of using the term genocide to describe the Papuan situation is weak. It is also potentially damaging to the cause of positive change in Papua.

Demographic change

One of the common charges is that the Papuans are subject to genocide by stealth, in the form of migration by non-Papuan settlers. Through looking at the figures on lifetime migration and religious affiliation, the broad patterns of demographic change can be discerned. While there were issues with the coverage of the 2000 census, there have not been any substantiated claims that the statistical data have been manipulated for political reasons, and these figures remain our best guide for understanding population trends in Papua (by which I mean the two contemporary provinces of Papua and West Papua).

If there was genocide in Papua, we would expect the number of Papuans to be declining. The 2000 census recorded ethnic composition of the population, showing there were 1,460,000 Papuans in the province, up from 890,000 in 1971. The yearly growth rate of 1.7 per cent is only marginally less than that of Indonesia as a whole of 1.8 per cent. While Papuans made up only two-thirds of the province’s population in 2000, their numbers are only decreasing in relative terms.

The case in favour of using the term genocide to describe the Papuan situation is weak, and it is potentially damaging to the cause of positive change in Papua

Much of the eastern part of the archipelago, of which Papua is one part, has experienced significant economic development over the last three decades, prompting large numbers of migrants to move to these areas of growth using the improving transport system. Between 1971 and 2000, the population of Papua increased from just over 920,000 to nearly 2,440,000. This is a seemingly large increase but it is a population growth of only 3.1 per cent per year over these three decades, this rate being lower than other provinces in eastern Indonesia such as East Kalimantan (4.2 per cent) or Southeast Sulawesi (3.2 per cent). Papua is also not the only province to experience high levels of immigration, with the percentage of lifetime migrants in East Kalimantan in 2000 (35 per cent of the population) being far higher than in Papua (20 per cent). Put in their broader Indonesian context, population changes in Papua don’t look like genocide, they just look like part of the normal pattern of inter-island migration.

Papua is also not the only province to experience high levels of immigration, with the percentage of lifetime migrants in East Kalimantan being far higher than in Papua

Migration was an important factor from the first few years after the Dutch left and the Indonesians took over. Initially there was an influx of Indonesians taking the higher level public service positions. By 1971 there were over one thousand tertiary educated Indonesians in the province (mostly from Java) compared to less than 100 Papuans educated to this level. This was a blow for the Papuan elites because the government was the dominant employer. There were also some transmigrants settled in Papua prior to the so-called Act of Free Choice in 1969 (surely an indication that Indonesia had every expectation that the vote would go the way they intended).

Transmigration and military violence

There were relatively low levels of migration through the 1970s, unsurprising for such a remote part of the nation, with the 1980s bringing settlers from Java due to increasing transmigration projects. The figure of 90,000 migrants in 1980 rose to 260,000 by 1990. The settlement of transmigrants along the PNG border was a government attempt to cement the incorporation of Papua into the nation. Since then, transmigration has ceased to be a major factor in demographic change. The importance of this program diminished in the 1990s with the rising number of self-financed migrants from Sulawesi and Maluku taking advantage of the improving shipping system. It is hard to accurately estimate the proportion of migrants who have arrived through the transmigration program but they probably represent less than a third of migrants overall. The transmigration program was finally halted in 2000.

Instead, the great majority of newcomers were not part of the transmigration program and came to settle in the towns and cities along the coast with little or no government assistance. The chief force bringing them to Papua has not been government policy but instead pull migration for economic reasons, with the migrants mainly coming from eastern Indonesia, particularly Sulawesi and Maluku. In urban areas, migrants from these areas made up 23 per cent of the population compared to 12 per cent from Java in 2000. The impression on the ground is that the proportion of migrants from Eastern Indonesia is rising.

Another common accusation is that the Indonesian military has been responsible for so many attacks on the population that they amount to attempted genocide. But genocidal actions would be expected to lead to gaps in the population statistics such as missing men in particular age groups. My analysis of the figures from all the censuses carried out in the province shows no evidence of such gaps. There are low male-female ratios for the 20-29 year age group but these low ratios do not carry over to older age groups in later censuses. It seems that young men are simply not being counted in the census, possibly due to their avoidance of government agencies or through difficulties in the administration of the census. Similar issues with counting young men were encountered by the statisticians in charge of the latest census in Britain.

Genocidal military actions would be expected to lead to gaps in the population statistics, but my analysis of the figures from all the censuses carried out in the province shows no evidence of such gaps

For particular ethnic groups who have been the victims of violence from the military, such as the highland Dani, the 2000 census did not show evidence of men missing on a large scale. Additionally, there are no large decreases in population figures in particular districts which would point to massacres of whole villages in these areas. All this is not to deny that there have been serious human rights abuses, but it seems they have not been on such a scale as to leave their mark on the population records.

Explaining the charges of genocide

The figures show that many of the provinces across Eastern Indonesia have experienced massive demographic change, change that has impacted greatly on the indigenous populations. So why are there suggestions of genocide in Papua but not in East Kalimantan or other eastern provinces? The reasons behind this are complex but involve the lower level of commitment to the Indonesian nation felt by Papuans, partly as a result of the separation of Papua from the new nation of Indonesia following the Pacific War. With the Dutch holding on to this half of New Guinea until 1962, an indigenous elite with an expectation of separate independence was born. The dashing of this hope by the Cold War politics of the time created resentment and little commitment to Indonesian nationalism.

There is also a subtext of racism implicit in much of the discussion of the genocide issue from both sides. Papuans suggest that they could never be part of Indonesia due to differences in skin colour (they are dark, Indonesians are light) or hair type (they have curly hair, Indonesians have straight hair). Such reliance on physical appearance in marking national identity – a racialist assumption of a sort that is repudiated these days in many parts of the world – is itself a response to the negative attitudes, including racist stereotyping, that many Indonesians show towards Papuans.

The charges of genocide also stem from Papuan social disadvantage. Migration patterns have indeed contributed to this disadvantage. The influx of economic migrants has impacted greatly on the indigenous populace, blocking them from gaining better education and employment in the coastal towns. Only one in five migrants in these towns are from another area of Papua, with the rest being migrants from outside the province. With most industries located along the coast, the better-educated migrants settling in these areas have tended to get the jobs in higher status sectors. For example, in the cities non-indigenous people are four times more likely to have jobs as traders than indigenous people. Overall, migrants hold more than 90 per cent of the lucrative jobs in trading.

The figures for rural areas are even more striking, with non-indigenous people being 16 times more likely to work in the trade sector than Papuans. Ethnic connections are important for getting jobs in Indonesia, and in helping migrants to establish themselves in towns. With few indigenous businesspeople, Papuans can’t use ethnic affiliation to obtain employment. The indigenous population continues to work in agriculture in rural areas, with the majority still in subsistence farming and only peripherally engaged with the modern economy.

Along with the majority of employment possibilities, the coastal urban areas have the best education opportunities. Illiteracy is only four per cent in the migrant-dominated capital Jayapura but it is nearly 60 per cent in the rural highlands of Jayawijaya. Migrants are more than twice as likely as indigenous people to have finished secondary school, and five times more likely to have tertiary qualifications. The poor standards of education in the areas where Papuans live, the distances between villages and schools (especially secondary schools), and financial obstacles to regular school attendance mean that many indigenous children do not obtain the education necessary to compete for employment.

The results of all these factors are that indigenous people have little chance of migrating to the towns, are unable to compete in the job market and do not see their children getting an education that will enable them to compete in the future. Rather than simply being the result of human rights abuses in the province, the current sense of a shared Papuan identity is more the result of the marginalisation of the indigenous people, and the understandable resentment and jealousy felt by this group towards the economic success of the newcomers.

With little realistic prospect of independence, working with the Indonesian side to implement policies to reduce corruption and the power of the military in Papua would be a vital first step to create trust in the government among the indigenous population

With little realistic prospect of independence, working with the Indonesian side to implement policies to reduce corruption and the power of the military in Papua would be a vital first step to create trust in the government among the indigenous population. In the longer term, policies to address the poor education standards of Papuans, assist indigenous small-businesses and enable more equality in employment are needed.

The claims of genocide in the province are mistaken and misleading. Such dramatising of the situation in Papua is only likely to result in the alienation of those Indonesian groups who are in a position to implement meaningful change. The ‘Papua Road Map ’ drawn up by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences suggests that some in the Indonesian academic community are willing to embrace such change. Let us hope that there are those in the bureaucracy and the military who can do the same in the future.

Stuart Upton (suptons@optusnet.com.au) completed his PhD about migration in Papua at the University of New South Wales in 2009.

Source: Inside Indonesia

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Genocide and demographic transformation in Papua

A response to Jim Elmslie and Stuart Upton

Richard Chauvel

Stripped of the obvious differences in rhetorical tone and values, the articles by Jim Elmslie and Stuart Upton have much in common. They both agree that:

Papua has experienced a large scale demographic transformation since 1963 the modern economy is dominated by Indonesian settlers and Papuans are marginalised Papuans suffer disadvantage in education, employment and health there have been significant human rights abuses by the Indonesian security forces One of the useful contributions that both articles make is that they place Papua in a broader regional context. In comparing the markedly different rates of population growth in Indonesian Papua and Papua New Guinea, Jim Elmslie asserts that the two are ‘comparable Melanesian societies’. Looking west to the rest of the archipelago, Stuart Upton argues that population change in Papua looks like ‘the normal pattern of inter-island migration rather than genocide’. Comparing Papua and PNG Had Jim Elmslie’s comparison been related to New Guinea prior to intensive Dutch, British/Australian and German intervention in the last decades of the nineteenth century, it would have been more convincing than it is today. However, over the last one hundred years, the heterogeneous Melanesian societies in the two halves of the island of New Guinea have come into contact and interacted with the world beyond New Guinea through very different colonial and post-colonial governance structures. This has made them very different places. In the case of PNG, Australian colonial rule and, since 1975, an indigenous Papuan political elite have been the mediating agencies. PNG was the sole Australian colony. The western half of the island was colonised by the Dutch as part of the Netherlands East Indies. Prior to the Pacific War, it was ruled through various administrative structures based in the neighbouring Maluku Islands. In the Australian territories, Australian administrators interacted directly with all levels and regions of PNG society. On the other side of the island, particularly before the Pacific War, there were more east Indonesian officials, police, teachers and missionaries than there were Dutch. The missionary education, the Christianity and the dialects of Malay that developed in Papua were those of the east Indonesian teachers and missionaries. Papuan contact with Indonesians in Papua and with Indonesian society outside Papua has intensified greatly since 1963. I am not suggesting, however, that the different patterns of change in the two halves of the island over the past century or so explain the difference in population growth rates. The poorer levels of health care in Indonesian Papua, especially in the highlands and remote and still predominantly Papuan regions compared to the ‘failed state’ the other side of the border is one factor that helps explain the differences in population growth. The most obvious difference generated by the divergent patterns of change is that PNG has remained a predominantly Melanesian society, while the western half of the island has become more ‘Indonesian’ through education, language and religious change as well as a demographic transformation. With these great changes, Indonesian Papua and PNG now have much less in common than before colonisation. Comparing Papua and East Indonesia Stuart Upton notes, correctly, that the percentage of migrants in East Kalimantan is in fact higher than in Papua. Yet, there has not been any independence movement in East Kalimantan and migration is not discussed in terms of genocide. This broader context of inter-island migration in Indonesia helps us to understand what makes Papua different. There are strongly divergent patterns of inter-island migration across the Indonesian archipelago. East Kalimantan and Papua are examples of frontier economy regions that have attracted large numbers of economic migrants. Maluku and the islands east of Bali have not had the same pulling power. South Sulawesi has experienced significant emigration to Papua and East Kalimantan, among other regions. There are a number of factors that help explain how demographic change has evoked a political, cultural and economic response in Papua that has not occurred in East Kalimantan. The Papuan discourse on demographic change is the product of an elite that has held positions in government, universities, the churches, NGOs and Papuan nationalist organisations since the last years of the Dutch administration. The governors and deputy governors of both Papuan provinces and all the district heads are now Papuans. The same positions in East Kalimantan are mostly held by politicians of South Sulawesi, Javanese or Banjarese background. The governor elected last year in East Kalimantan is the first indigenous politician to hold that position, and the heads of two indigenous-majority districts, Kutai Barat and Malinau, are Dayak politicians. Other important officeholders are mostly migrants or their descendants. In contrast to the Papuans, the indigenous peoples of East Kalimantan are poorly represented in the democratic structures of post-Suharto Indonesia. Another factor is the history of migration. The coastal areas of East Kalimantan were integrated in the trading and religious network of Malay-Muslim sultanates of the western archipelago prior to the region’s incorporation into the Netherlands East Indies. The populations of these sultanates in coastal East Kalimantan were cosmopolitan. The development of the oil industry around Balikpapan from the 1920s attracted economic migrants from outside East Kalimantan. In Papua, Indonesian immigration is understood to be a consequence of the territory’s incorporation into Indonesia: a very different situation from East Kalimantan or other high immigration provinces In Papua, with the exception of the relatively small number of strategically placed east Indonesian servants of the Dutch administration, mass migration of Indonesians to Papua started with the advent of Indonesian rule in 1963. The older members of the Papuan elite can remember meeting their first Indonesian. Benny Giay, in his biography of the Rev Herman Saud, records that Saud and his fellow secondary school students in the Birds Head region (from Manokwari west to Sorong) had not met an Indonesian prior to 1963. Saud recalled that they did not know what to expect of Indonesians and their culture. Herman Saud became the head of the Papua’s largest protestant church and witnessed from the Synod Office the transformation of Jayapura, where the office was located, into an Indonesian city. In 2005, towards the end of his period as head of the Church, Saud raised his concerns about the ongoing arrival of Indonesian economic migrants with the provincial parliament, asking rhetorically if migrant labour was the only way to develop Papua. In short, Indonesian immigration in Papua is understood to be a consequence of the territory’s incorporation into Indonesia. Given that in the eyes of many Papuans their incorporation into Indonesia occurred without their participation or agreement, the Indonesian migration that followed is likewise highly contested. That’s a very different situation from East Kalimantan or other high immigration provinces. Stuart Upton has identified, correctly, that the administrative separation of Papua from the rest of Indonesia from 1942 until 1962 was a reason for weaker commitment to the Indonesian nation state in Papua. The isolation of Papua before the Pacific War, its relatively recent incorporation into the Netherlands East Indies and its separation afterwards meant that there was little Papuan participation in the ‘making’ of Indonesia through involvement in nationalist organisations, the struggle for independence and the nation-building policies of the Sukarno years. With respect to the latter, Papuans were the object rather than the subject. Not only did many in the Papuan elite find the idea of an independent nation more attractive than incorporation in Indonesia, but during the last years of the Dutch administration they had been the beneficiaries of Dutch policies of ‘Papuanisation’ of the bureaucracy. As Stuart Upton notes, many of the early Indonesian migrants were those who assumed senior government positions, taking over not only positions previously held by the Dutch, but also those occupied by Papuans. It is worth noting that the Papuan nationalist constructions of their identity, in terms of differences in physical appearance between themselves and Indonesians and as responses to the racist Indonesian stereotyping of Papuans, were first developed in the 1950s and early 1960s – well before the onset of large scale migration. The reference points in these constructions were the east Indonesian servants of the Dutch administration, who occupied the bureaucratic positions to which the Papuan graduates of vocational training colleges and missionary schools aspired. Beyond the figures Jim Elmslie and Stuart Upton use an analysis of census data to debate whether genocide has occurred in Papua. This is not how Papuans discuss genocide and Indonesian migration. The Papuan discourse, amongst intellectuals and politicians and more broadly in society, is based on collective subjective experience. As Budi Hernawan and Theo van den Broek in their discussion of ‘Memoria passionis’ (memory of suffering) noted, if you visit remote parts of Papua you can easily hear stories of suffering from ordinary people: ‘Our father was killed in that river. On the side of the mountain there used to be villages, which were destroyed by ABRI [The Indonesian Military]’. Accusations of genocide are often directly linked to demands for independence Accusations of genocide against the Indonesian military and government retain their currency in popular discourse and as political slogans. Demonstrators in Jayapura at the time of the legislative elections earlier this year held banners demanding: ‘Immediately withdraw organic and non-organic military units from West Papua…Stop genocide against Melanesians in West Papua’. Accusations of genocide are often directly linked to demands for independence. For example, one participant in the mass consultation (Mubes) of Papuan nationalists in February 2000 suggested: ‘In ten years time Papuans will all be killed by the Indonesian military; better that we become independent now.’ Papuan discussions of genocide might focus on the presence and human rights abuses of the Indonesian military as well as the intentions of the Indonesian government, but also encompass a broad range of issues including dispossession, marginalisation and various forms of disadvantage that demographic change and the pattern of economic development have brought for many Papuans. Some Papuan discussions of the spread of transmission of HIV/AIDS and the role of the Indonesian authorities therein are conspiratorial. Stuart Upton is not the first person to suggest that the racist language in which some Papuans discuss their own identity, Indonesian migration and accusations of genocide has been repudiated by the international community given that its continued use is counter-productive. That well-educated and worldly-wise Papuan leaders continue to use such language is a measure of their concern about the threats posed to their society and culture as well as an expression of their alienation from and distrust of the Indonesian government. For these reasons I agree with Jim Elmslie that West Papuan opinions and experiences deserve to be taken seriously. Putting a figure on the loss of life is problematic, however. Elmslie cites a death toll of 100,000. That a figure is routinely quoted, as this one has been, does not make it any more or less accurate. The core problem, as Elmslie concedes, is that the research has not been done and, in current political circumstances, is unlikely to be done. Tapol’s West Papua: The Obliteration of a People, a booklet published in 1983 stated that ‘Estimates of the numbers killed or who have died as a result of Indonesian repression, suppression or neglect range from 100,000 to 150,000 since 1963.’ The range of estimates of lives lost has not changed much over more than two decades, despite the conduct of numerous military operations. Elmslie cites a death toll of 100,000. That a figure is routinely quoted does not make it any more or less accurate The Human Rights Watch Report, Out of Sight: Endemic Abuse and Impunity in Papua’s Central Highlands (July 2007) illustrates some of the difficulties faced when investigating violence and human rights abuses in one of the most tightly controlled and conflict-ridden regions in Papua. Working without the cooperation of the Indonesian authorities, the researchers found that the Indonesian security forces ‘…continue to engage in largely indiscriminate village “sweeping” operations in pursuit of suspected militants, using excessive, often brutal, and at times lethal force against civilians’. This indiscriminate abuse by the security forces of Indonesian citizens and their livelihoods suggests that the civilian and military leaders in Jakarta have limited capacity to control the conduct of their troops operating in Papua. The security forces’ behaviour serves to further alienate both the communities directly affected and Papuan society as a whole. However, this carefully documented Human Rights Watch report does not provide evidence that there has been systematic killing of large numbers of Papuans. Rather it provides insights into how systemic violence pervades relations between the security forces and Papuan communities. We should respect Papuans’ discussions of the demographic transformation of their society and endeavour to understand the experience they are describing. However, I suspect that the use of the term genocide obstructs our comprehension of the endemic nature of state violence against Indonesian citizens in Papua and makes the necessary institutional reform and cultural transformation of the Indonesian security forces more difficult. ii Richard Chauvel (richard.chauvel@vu.edu.au) teaches at Victoria University.

Source: Inside Indonesia

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